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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. **77-6068**

EUGENE MINOR,

Petitioner,

-vs-

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

EUGENE MINOR,

Petitioner,

LEE M. NATION,

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

Petitioner, EUGENE MINOR, prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court entered in the above-entitled case on October 15, 1977.

OPINION BELOW

The opinion and decision of the Missouri Supreme Court is reported at 556 S.W.2d 35. A copy of the opinion appears in Appendix A attached hereto.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Missouri Supreme Court (Appendix A) was originally entered on September 27, 1977. Thereafter, on September 29, 1977, a timely motion for rehearing was filed. see, Rule 84.17, Missouri Rules of Court. Petitioner's motion for rehearing was overruled by the Missouri Supreme Court on October 11, 1977. By the aforesaid denial of the motion for rehearing, the opinion and decision of September 27, 1977 became the final judgment of the highest court in the State of Missouri.

The jurisdiction of this court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1257(3).

QUESTION PRESENTED

I

WHETHER MISSOURI'S STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME FOR THE SELECTION OF PETIT JURORS -- WHICH GRANTS WOMEN AN AUTOMATIC EXEMPTION BASED SOLELY ON SEX -- DENIED PETITIONER HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS MANDATED AND INTERPRETED BY THIS COURT'S OPINION IN *Taylor v. Louisiana*, 412 U.S. (1975).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

This case involves the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution:

Sixth Amendment

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, . . ."

Fourteenth Amendment

". . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States' nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws."

STATEMENT

Petitioner, EUGENE MINOR, was charged by indictment with the crimes of Murder, First Degree and Robbery, First Degree. Jury trial was held in the Jackson County Circuit Court (Hall, J.) in Kansas City. Verdicts of guilt were returned as to each count and Petitioner was sentenced to one hundred and fifty years (150) confinement in the Missouri Division of Corrections.

HOW FEDERAL QUESTIONS ARE PRESENTED

1. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to quash the petit jury panel on the basis that women were systematically excluded from jury service. A hearing was held: John Fitzgerald, Jackson County Jury Commissioner, testified that potential jurors are randomly selected from the Jackson County voter registration lists; these persons are sent questionnaires to determine their eligibility for jury service. By statute, this questionnaire prominently states:

"TO WOMEN:

The Constitution permits women to elect to serve or not to serve as jurywomen. Any woman who elects not to serve will fill out this paragraph and mail this questionnaire to the jury commissioner at once. It will not be necessary to answer the other questions.

I elect not to perform jury service."

See Appendix 11, Exhibit 1. Questionnaires returned showing no exemption were placed in the jury wheel. Evidence was received that the jury wheel was 29.1% female. Each week, names are randomly selected for jury service; these persons are then sent summons for jury service. The summons reads:

"Women, if you do not wish to serve, return this summons to the Judge named on the reverse side as quickly as possible."

See Appendix 2, Exhibit 2. The Jury Commissioner also testified that if a woman failed to respond to the summons, she was deemed to have exercised her option not to serve. Evidence was also received concerning the number of women appearing for jury service prior to Petitioner's trial. That evidence is as follows: June, 1975 - 15.9% women; July, 1975 - 15.1% women; August, 1975 - 13% women; September, 1975 - 13.7% women; October, 1975 - 10.9% women; January, 1976 - 12.3% women; February, 1976 - 17.6% women; March, 1976 - 15.5% women. Petitioner's panel of fifty-five (55) had six (6) women (10.9%) and his jury of twelve was all male. Census data was also received showing Jackson County, Missouri to be 54% women.

At the close of Petitioner's presentation, the State produced no evidence and the motion to quash was overruled.

2. Subsequent to his trial, Petitioner filed a timely motion for new trial alleging the instant allegation. A timely appeal was prosecuted to the Missouri Supreme Court which held consolidated arguments on the cases *State of Missouri vs. Billy Duran*; *State of Missouri vs. Eugene Minor*, *State of Missouri vs. Emerson E. Harlin*, and *State of Missouri v. Vincent X. Lee* (petitions for writs of certiorari on these cases are being filed concurrently herewith). The opinion affirming Petitioner's conviction became final on October 11, 1977. The question presented herein was raised and argued before the trial court and the Missouri Supreme Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING
THE WRIT

The opinion and decision of the Missouri Supreme Court in the instant case is in direct conflict with past decision of this Court, various federal courts of appeals and several state high courts. Specifically, Petitioner contends the instant opinion is in conflict with *Taylor vs. Louisiana*, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) and thus, cannot stand. *Taylor* held Article VII, Section 41 of the Louisiana Constitution and Article 402 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure (since repealed) violative of *Taylor's* due process rights guaranteed by the XIV Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Louisiana law is reproduced here for the convenience of the Court:

Article VII, Louisiana Constitution

§41. Selection of jurors; women jurors; trial by judge; trial by jury.

The Legislature shall provide for the selection and drawing of competent and intelligent jurors for the trial of civil and criminal cases; provided, however, that no woman shall be drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously filed with the clerk of the District Court a written declaration of her desire to be subject to such service. All cases in which the punishment may not be at hard labor shall, until otherwise provided by law, be tried by the judge without a jury. Cases, in which the punishment may be at hard labor, shall be tried by a jury of five, all of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases, in which the punishment is necessarily at hard labor, by a jury of twelve, nine of whom must concur to render a verdict; cases in which the punishment may be capital, by a jury of twelve, all of whom must concur to render a verdict.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 402. Service of women as jurors.

A woman shall not be selected for jury service unless she has previously filed with the clerk of court of the parish in which she resides a written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service.

The United States Supreme Court in *Taylor* re-examined the question of automatic exclusion of women from the juries previously decided by that Court in *Hoyt v. Florida*, 368 U.S. 57, 7 L.Ed.2d 118, 82 S.Ct. 159 (1961) and they reached a different result. Accordingly, the Court stated:

"Accepting as we do however, the view that the VI Amendment affords the Defendant in a criminal trial the opportunity to have the jury drawn from venires representative of the community, we think it is no longer tenable to hold that women as a class may be excluded or given automatic exemptions based solely on sex if the consequences are that criminal jury venires are almost totally male."

(42 L.Ed.2d 690 at 702) [emphasis added]

The question presented herein then whether Missouri offers an "automatic exemption based solely on sex" and if, "the consequences are that criminal jury venires are almost totally male."

The Missouri Constitution, Article I, Section 22(b) states: "No citizen shall be disqualified from jury service because of sex, but the court shall excuse any woman who requests exemption therefrom before being sworn as a juror." This Article is implemented by Section 497.130, Missouri Revised Statutes (1974), which section allows women to "elect to serve or not to serve as jury women."

When placed side by side and examined, the Missouri system and the Louisiana system (later changed) both offer an absolute exemption to jury service based strictly upon gender. The difference being only that in Louisiana the woman must affirmatively opt for service while her Missouri sister must affirmatively choose not to serve.

The Appellant's argument is much better stated by the United States Supreme Court's final paragraph in the *Taylor* opinion:

" . . . but the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof."

The term "reasonably representative thereof" points out the failing of the panel to which the Petitioner objected. It cannot be said that six (6) women on a panel of fifty-five is "reasonably representative" nor does that panel constitute a "cross-section of the community."

Petitioner concludes that "(t)he States remain free to prescribe relevant qualifications for their jurors and to provide reasonable exemptions. . ." *Taylor v. Louisiana*, at 538. Petitioner, however, does not believe that a blanket exemption for women is a reasonable exemption. Indeed, as pointed by Mr. Justice Seiler in his dissenting opinion in *State v. Billy Duren*, 556 S.W.2d 11, 24, n.4 (1977):

"The federal court (the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri) provides for excuse on request by a woman charged with care of minor children without adequate domestic help."

Petitioner maintains that this is a reasonable exemption for women and would not serve to deny an accused his constitutional right to a representative jury: in the federal court in Kansas City, 53% of the persons on jury wheel are women and 39.8% of the actual jurors chosen were women. 556 S.W.2d at 24. This data can be contrasted with the Missouri courts: 29% of the persons on the wheel are women; seldom over 15% of the persons appearing for jury service are women; and often, as in the case-at-bar, juries are all male.

Since *Taylor*, several states have been faced with challenges to exemptions to women. All, except Missouri, have changed the exemption by either statute or court decision, see, e.g. *State v. Gethers*, 227 S.E.2d 832 (Ga.App.1976); *Robinson v. Kimbrough*, 540 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.1976); *New York Judiciary Law* 549(7); *Conn. Gen.Stat.Rev.* §51-218, 219; *Ga.Code Ann.* §59-112(6); *La.Stat.Ann.* §13-3055; *Okla.Stat.Ann. Title 38* §28; *Rhode Island Gen.Laws Ann.* §9-9-11; *Utah Code Ann.* §78-46-10(14). Missouri remains the only state with an automatic exemption for women. Further, this exemption causes gross underrepresentation of women on jury panels. (See attached exhibits as to the women appearing for jury service). The instant opinion cannot stand as a correct interpretation of this Court's opinion in *Taylor*. Unlike the Missouri Supreme Court, Petitioner does not believe *Taylor* stands for the proposition that any percentages of women on jury panels, higher than those found in *Taylor*, is constitutionally permissible; instead *Taylor* condemns jury mechanisms which deny an accused his right to a jury drawn from a reasonable cross-section of society. The Missouri jury selection system is of such a breed: Petitioner's panel (10% women) cannot be considered as representative of society.


Accordingly, a Writ of Certiorari should issue to review the opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court affirming Petitioner's conviction.

CONCLUSION


WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari to the Missouri Supreme Court.

EUGENE MINOR

Petitioner


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A copy of the above and foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, on this the 16 day of January, 1978 to Attorney General John Ashcroft, Office of the Attorney General, Supreme Court Building, Jefferson City, Missouri 65101.


LEE M. NATION

JAMES W. FLETCHER

RENDLEN, Judge.

Charged by indictment with robbery first degree with a deadly and dangerous weapon and felony-murder: robbery, defendant was convicted on each count and sentenced under the Second Offender Act to consecutive terms of fifty years and life imprisonment, respectively. Defendant appealed to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City district, and raised questions of constitutional construction falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Mo.Const. Art. V, § 3, as amended in 1976. The cause was transferred here prior to opinion.

Seven assignments of error are presented: (1) Failure to quash the jury panel because Missouri's jury selection process systematically excludes women; (2) Erroneous joinder and refusal to sever the two felony charges; (3) Wrongful refusal to grant mistrial following improper prosecutorial statement; (4) Improper sentencing under the Second Offender Act when the trial court failed to make findings sufficient to invoke its application; (5) Failure to give defendant's requested verdict directing instruction to the effect that defendant had withdrawn from the robbery before the murder and hence was not guilty of felony murder; (6) Failure to give instruction MAI-CR 1.08 before each recess; (7) Failure to give instruction MAI-CR 2.70, admonishing the jury to consider the law and evidence as to each count separately.

Sufficiency of the evidence not being raised, a brief statement will suffice at this point, though additional facts pertinent to individual points will be supplied when necessary. On January 2, 1975, defendant entered Traxler's Pharmacy in Kansas City with an accomplice; brandishing a revolver, he ordered the store owner and a customer to get down and began to rake drugs into a pillow case. During the robbery another accomplice entered, warning that the police had arrived. The robbers ran into the back room where the rear door was located but it was firmly locked. Two officers of the Kansas City Police Department had come to the scene and one covered the back door

from outside, the other officer, Mestdagh, entered the store. Mestdagh went through the store to the back room where scuffling was heard followed by the sound of three shots. Almost immediately defendant and another of the robbers emerged from the room and were apprehended near the store as they attempted to flee. Mestdagh's body, riddled by three bullets, was found in the back room.

I

[1] Defendant first contends the trial court erred in failing to quash the panel because Missouri's jury selection process, Mo.Const. Art. I, § 22(b) and § 494.031(2), RSMo Supp. 1975, systematically excludes women from jury service and is therefore unconstitutional, citing *Taylor v. Louisiana*, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). *State v. Duren*, No. 59914, 556 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.banc 1977), decided concurrently with the case at bar, upheld the challenged constitutional section and its implementing statute which permit women the privilege of declining jury service and that decision is dispositive of this defendant's sex based challenge to the facial validity of the cited sections.

[2] The remaining question is whether from the evidence it has been shown that the Jackson County jury selection process resulted in criminal venires not "representative of the community" and "almost totally male", as those constitutional standards were delineated in *Taylor*, requiring reversal in this case. By stipulation the evidence presented in the proceeding to quash the jury panel in *State v. Lee*, 556 S.W.2d 25 (Mo.banc 1977), another case decided concurrently herewith, was introduced in the case at bar. Defendant also introduced the list of jurors summoned during the week of trial (December 8, 1975), however, this exhibit was not filed with this court nor included in the transcript on appeal. The panel of 55 in defendant's case had 6 women (10.9%) and the final 12 were men. The evidence does not differ significantly from *Lee*, hence the contention is denied.

II

[3] It is next contended the court erred permitting joinder of charges in a single indictment and compounded the error by denying severance, forcing defense of both in a single trial. The murder of Mestdagh and the drugstore robbery were simultaneous or sequential parts of a single escape occurring at the same location, constituting different criminal offenses. The state has not attempted to present unconnected crimes in the same trial and joinder of the charges was permissible under Rule 24.04 as amended in 1971.¹ See *State v. Baker*, 524 S.W.2d 122 (Mo.banc 1975).

In *State v. Duren*, *supra*, this court considered a constitutional challenge to Rule 24.04, essentially the same as that made by this defendant. That ruling controls here and as in *Duren*, defendant has neither suggested nor has our examination of the record disclosed abuse of discretion in denial of the requested severance. This allegation of error is denied.

III

Defendant complains the trial court erred denying defendant's request for mistrial, prompted by the prosecutor's opening statement that defendant's companion, John Francis, admitted complicity in the robbery. The court overruled the motion but warned the prosecutor, out of the jury's hearing, ". . . don't make any more statements like that." The objectionable statement was as follows: "The evidence will further be that at police headquarters that night, detectives in the Crimes Against Persons Unit interviewed John Francis and they identified this defendant, Eugene Minor; that they were told several stories, but ultimately after this defendant was permitted to talk to John Francis in private, both John Francis and this defendant, Eugene

Minor, admitted their complicity in this robbery. Each of them denied being the one to shoot Russell Mestdagh, but each admitted their participation in this robbery."

[4] It first should be noted the state may not show that a non-testifying co-indictee has been convicted or pled guilty to the same crime as that which the defendant stands charged, *State v. Fenton*, 499 S.W.2d 813 (Mo.App.1973), nor may the state introduce evidence implicating only the co-indictee, *State v. Mullen*, 523 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. App.1975). See also *State v. Castino*, 264 S.W.2d 372 (Mo.1954). Further, *Bruton v. United States*, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) condemned the prosecutor's introduction of an accomplice's confession by a third party implicating the defendant because defendant was denied the opportunity of cross-examining the accomplice and confrontation of his accusers.

[5,6] Here, no attempt was made to introduce evidence of Francis' confession, instead the prosecutor's statement referred only to admission of complicity in the robbery and the fact that Francis denied having shot Officer Mestdagh. The prosecutor claimed the investigating detectives and Francis "identified this defendant, Eugene Minor; that they were told several stories but ultimately after this defendant was permitted to talk to John Francis in private, both John Francis and this defendant, Eugene Minor, admitted *their* complicity in the robbery." (Emphasis ours.) Use of the third person plural possessive 'their' indicates that Francis and Minor both admitted the others' as well as his own complicity. However, in the next sentence the prosecutor stated, "*each* of them denied being the one to shoot Russell Mestdagh, but *each* admitted *their* participation in this robbery."² (Emphasis ours.) From this ambi-

1. Rule 24.04, effective July 1, 1971, provides in part: "All offenses which are based on the same act or on two or more acts which are part of the same transaction or on two or more acts or transactions which constitute parts of a common scheme or plan may be charged in the same indictment or information in separate

counts, or in the same count when authorized by statute."

2. In such cases when "their" is used colloquially with the singular antecedent "each", the use of the pronoun "their" is intended as the third person singular possessive "his". See Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition 1974, p. 1474.

guity it can reasonably be argued the prosecutor, by the colloquial usage, intended to state that each admitted *his* participation but not that of the other. Regardless of the interpretation of the prosecutor's remarks, i. e., whether Francis implicated only himself or Minor as well, the statement was objectionable. Nevertheless we do not believe it was prejudicial, requiring mistrial. The remedy of mistrial is a drastic one, *State v. Johnson*, 504 S.W.2d 23 (Mo.1973) and is to be exercised only in those circumstances where the alleged prejudice can be removed in no other way. *State v. Goff*, 490 S.W.2d 88 (Mo.1973); *State v. Pruitt*, 479 S.W.2d 785 (Mo.1972); *State v. Blockton*, 526 S.W.2d 915 (Mo.App. 1975). As stated in *State v. Camper*, 391 S.W.2d 926, 928 (Mo.1965):

"... the declaration of a mistrial necessarily and properly rests largely in the discretion of the trial court who has observed the incident giving rise to the request for a mistrial, and who is in a better position than an appellate court to evaluate the prejudicial effect and possibility of its removal by action short of a mistrial."

[7] Though defendant's motion for mistrial was overruled, his objection to the statement was in effect sustained by the trial court's warning to the prosecuting attorney against further "statements like that". The defense made no request that the court instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statement or for similar remedial action. Moreover defendant's guilt was established by abundant evidence. There is no question of identity, indeed defendant did not deny his presence at the scene but claimed only that he did not participate in the robbery; that he was merely a disinterested bystander. He explained his running from the drugstore as an effort to escape being hit by stray gunfire. Two witnesses (the owner and a customer) with ample opportunity for observation inside the drugstore, positively identified defendant at a lineup and in court as one of the non-masked robbers. Each saw defendant with a gun and the owner, who was ordered to open the cash register, saw defendant

stuff a pillowcase with drugs and while in the front room, fire his pistol. Both witnesses saw defendant and one companion flee to the rear of the store when the police arrived and shortly after Officer Mestdagh pursued the robbers into the back room, they heard scuffling followed by gunfire. Immediately after the gunshots, one witness saw defendant leave the back room and another (who had taken cover) heard footsteps of someone leaving the store. Officer Gaugh, seeing defendant as he emerged from the store with a handgun, gave chase and was able to catch and arrest him. Five other witnesses identified defendant as the man running from the store and chased by Officer Gaugh.

After defendant was taken to police headquarters and informed of his *Miranda* rights, he admitted participation in the crime in the presence of two detectives and two employees of the prosecuting attorney's office, but later refused to sign a typewritten statement containing his confession.

Our function is to determine, whether as a matter of law, the trial court abused its discretion to the prejudice of defendant in refusing to grant a mistrial. The prosecutor's somewhat ambiguous comment was not followed by further objectionable reference in opening statement, during testimony or in closing argument. The trial judge observed the incident and has the better position to assess its effect and determine measures necessary to cure it. In this case where the evidence of guilt is strong we cannot find prejudice spawned by the prosecutor's improper opening remarks warranting reversal. See *Schneble v. Florida*, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); *State v. DeGraffenreid*, 477 S.W.2d 57, 65 [15] (Mo. banc 1972). The point is denied.

IV

[8] Tried under the Second Offender Act (§ 556.280, RSMo 1969), defendant contends the trial court's findings were inadequate to invoke the court's sentencing authority. The court found appellant had a

previous felony conviction for which he served time in the custody of the Missouri Division of Corrections and that § 556.280, RSMo 1969, was applicable. In *State v. Blackwell*, 459 S.W.2d 268 (Mo.banc 1970) such findings were approved as sufficient under the Act. See also *State v. Bolden*, 525 S.W.2d 625 (Mo.App.1975); *State v. Abernathy*, 515 S.W.2d 812 (Mo.App.1974); *State v. Shumate*, 516 S.W.2d 297 (Mo.App. 1974). The point is without merit.

V

The trial court refused a proffered instruction concerning defendant's alleged withdrawal from the robbery before the murder of Officer Mestdagh. The proposed instruction was as follows:

"If you find and believe from the evidence that on January 2, 1975, Eugene Minor withdrew from his participation in the robbery of Traxler's Drugstore and that after his withdrawal from the robbery of Traxler's Drugstore Officer Mestdagh was killed by another party acting without the aid or encouragement of Mr. Minor, you must find Mr. Minor not guilty of felony murder."

The only evidence (buttressed by all favorable inferences) supporting defendant's contentions may be summarized as follows: When defendant saw Officer Mestdagh coming into the store, he ran into the back room to escape, but was unable to do so. The officer entered the back room to and drew his revolver from its holster. Defendant then crawled from the back room to the front door and ran outside. Witnesses then heard several shots fired in the rear room of the store where Mestdagh's body was found.

A remarkably similar fact situation is found in *State v. Johnson*, 524 S.W.2d 97 (Mo.banc 1975), reversed on other grounds. There two robbers entered a store, the co-indictee bound the owner in a back room, while defendant rifled the cash register and looted the store. When finished, defendant

said, "Come on, let's go, I have got the stuff," and the owner heard him leave. The co-indictee remained to take the contents of the safe, but was interrupted by two police officers, one of whom he killed in the ensuing shootout. This court approved a felony-murder instruction given in the defendant's trial, noting that "the killing occurred 'in flight from the scene of the crime to prevent detection or promote escape'".

[9-11] It has uniformly been held in Missouri, as in *Johnson*, that escape from a robbery or robbery attempt is part of the crime, *State v. Glenn*, 429 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. banc 1968); *State v. Engberg*, 376 S.W.2d 150 (Mo.1964); *State v. Jasper*, 486 S.W.2d 268 (Mo.banc 1972); *State v. Adams*, 98 S.W.2d 632 (Mo.1936), and "If two or more persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal, if the other (or others) commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose, or as a natural or probable consequence thereof." *State v. Chervick*, 278 S.W.2d 741, 746 [2] (Mo.1955) (Emphasis added). See also *State v. Paxton*, 453 S.W.2d 923 (Mo.1970); *State v. Williams*, 548 S.W.2d 227 (Mo.App.1977); *State v. Sneed*, 549 S.W.2d 105 (Mo.App. 1977). The murder resulting from the attempted escape was a natural and probable consequence of the original crime especially when firearms were employed in the underlying felony. It matters not whether defendant or his accomplice shot the police officer, under the interpretation of the evidence most favorable to defendant, the proffered instruction was properly refused.

VI

[12, 13] Defendant complains the court erroneously failed to give MAI-CR 1.08 before each trial recess as required by Rule 20.02(a).³ Rule 20.02(e) provides that fail-

[1] "Prior to voir dire examination of the jury the court must read to the jury MAI-CR 1.02."

3. The first three sentences of Rule 20.02(a), with numbers and emphasis added, require:

ure to give a required instruction "shall constitute error, its prejudicial effect to be judicially determined." Since the rule's adoption it has been held that giving instructions containing the substance though not the form of MAI-CR 1.08 is non-prejudicial, absent a showing of jury misconduct. *State v. Gaye*, 532 S.W.2d 783 (Mo.App. 1975); *State v. Abbott*, 547 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. App.1977). See also *State v. Brown*, 502 S.W.2d 295 (Mo.1973), and *State v. Vernor*, 522 S.W.2d 312 (Mo.App.1975).

In *Abbott*, *supra*, the trial court failed in one instance to give MAI-CR 1.08(b) before a trial recess. In response to an allegation of error it was held no prejudice occurred because: (1) the jury had, prior to the omission, been admonished as required by MAI-CR 1.08(a) & (b), (2) the jury was instructed at all subsequent recesses and (3) counsel for defendant did not object to the omission or seek remedial action. The court of appeals noted the deference due the trial court's action in overruling defendant's motion for new trial because of its vantage point for observing the jury's conduct. Here the effect of the court's failure to give the instruction at the noon recess before the petit jury was sworn was ameliorated by the following: (1) the panel had a short time earlier received the court's admonition of somewhat similar character through MAI-CR 1.02,⁴ (2) at the first recess following the noon recess the court gave a slightly modified form of MAI-CR 1.08(a), (3) at the first recess after the jury was sworn the court gave MAI-CR 1.08(a) verbatim, (4) at the seven subsequent recesses the court

instructed the jury on substantially the same subject matter as MAI-CR 1.08(b) and in some instances went beyond the requirements of 1.08(b). There was substantial compliance with the Rule and defendant failed to object to the omission or variance in the instructions given from MAI-CR 1.08. The state has shown by the record no prejudice occurred and we find the error harmless.

VII

[14] Finally defendant claims the court's failure to give instruction MAI-CR 2.70 in this two count indictment case constituted reversible error. The notes on use to MAI-CR 2.70 declare that when multiple counts are submitted, the instruction's purpose is to apprise the jury that evidence as to each count is to be considered separately. See *State v. Johnson*, 537 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. App.1976). The robbery and the murder were parts of the same transaction and the testimony concerning each offense related to the other. All evidence concerning the robbery was essential to the felony-murder charge and most relating to the murder was relevant to the robbery, as the murder occurred during the attempted escape phase. It is difficult to see how the jury could have been misled by considering testimony as to either crime. To assist the jury separate verdict directors were submitted for the robbery and for the murder, each carrying the proviso directing acquittal if the jury did not believe every submitted element.

[2] "after the jury has been sworn but before the opening statements, the court must read to the jury MAI-CR Nos. 1.06, 2.01 and 2.02."

[3] "before each recess or adjournment of the court the court must read to the jury MAI-CR 1.08."

The chronology of items as set forth in the cited portion of the Rule would suggest that MAI-CR 1.08 need not be given except at recesses declared after the jury is sworn and after opening statements. Such an interpretation would cure the omission here. However, we interpret the Rule to require giving 1.08 before each recess or adjournment of the court after the jury panel is sworn for voir dire examination.

4. At the commencement of voir dire, the court read MAI-CR 1.02 advising the array that the 12 selected for jury duty "will be instructed later that you are not to discuss this case with anyone or among yourselves until the case is concluded and you are sent to the jury room with written instructions of the law and to deliberate upon your verdict." The instruction contained the further admonition that attorneys for the state and the defendant, as officers of the court, will avoid saying anything to the jury other than formal salutations and "the same applies to witnesses and to the defendant. They have been or will be instructed to avoid all contacts with the jury even to talk about matters wholly unrelated to the case."

The issues were further pinpointed by four appropriate verdict forms referencing the counts and crimes. These factors weigh heavily against a finding of prejudice stemming from the omission of MAI-CR 2.70. *State v. Johnson, supra*; *State v. Nelson*, 532 S.W.2d 855 (Mo.App.1975). In addition, an incident occurred demonstrating that the jury considered the law and evidence as to each count separately. During its deliberations the jury sent a note to the court asking "If a person participates in an armed robbery and a murder results in an escape attempt—is that person guilty of murder even though there is no evidence he did do the shooting? The instructions are not clear on this point. Roy L. Dickerson, Foreman."⁵ Manifest in this inquiry is the jury's sharp attention to the separate elements of each crime and an awareness that evidence concerning the shooting, which followed the central acts of the robbery, was not accompanied by direct evidence of who fired the shots. It is apparent the jurors understood the evidence and rationally considered each crime, but had questions concerning the law of felony-murder which they later resolved by their separate verdicts. See *State v. Boyington*, 544 S.W.2d 300 (Mo.App.1976). The purpose of MAI-CR 2.70 to assure that the jury, in reaching its verdict, applies the law and evidence to each charge independently, was fulfilled. The state has shown by the record and reasonable inferences therefrom that no prejudice occurred and we find the error harmless. However, this result in this case does not indicate necessarily the same result in other cases wherein MAI-CR 2.70 is not given. The directions in MAI-CR provide that it is to be given in all cases wherein there are multiple counts and trial judges are admonished to follow that direction.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

MORGAN, C. J., and HENLEY and FINCH, JJ., concur.

DONNELLY, J., concurs in result.

BARDGETT, J., dissents for reasons stated in the dissenting portion of his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in *State v. Duren*, No. 59914, 556 S.W.2d 11.

SEILER, J., dissents for reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in *State v. Duren*, No. 59914, 556 S.W.2d 11.



5. The court replied in writing: "To the jury: Read all the written instructions. Judge Hall."

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY, MISSOURI

Summons for Jury Service

To

FRANK A MARTINEZ

1822 BROADWAY

140

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64108

YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to appear before the Honorable
TIMOTHY D. O'LEARY, Judge of DIVISION 15 of the
Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri IN KANSAS
CITY AT 12TH & OAK IN RM 301, ON MONDAY THE 21
day of APRIL, 1975 AT 9 15 o'clock AM to serve as a
juror until discharged.


IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR YOU MAY BE HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
BRING THIS SUMMONS WITH YOU.
PLEASE READ THE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE SIDE. Jury Commissioner
(OVER)



FRANK A MARTINEZ

1822 BROADWAY

KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI 64108



APRIL

21

DEF. EX 2
MIL 9 1975
P. A. GOTNER

PLEASE BRING THIS ENTIRE CARD WITH
YOU WHEN YOU APPEAR AT THE JURY
ASSEMBLY ROOM.

INSTRUCTIONS

Please note the Judge and location on the front side of this card. You must report to him on the day and at the time specified.

No male juror shall be excused from service except for sufficiently valid reasons to be APPROVED BY THE JUDGE or upon PERSONAL APPEARANCE BEFORE SAID JUDGE AS SHOWN ON THE FRONT OF THIS CARD. Applications for excuses must be presented to said Judge on or before 12 o'clock noon on the Thursday preceeding the date which you are to appear as shown on the reverse side.

A physically disabled juror must show that to appear and serve would endanger his health. Such proof must be in the form of a doctor's certificate and be presented to the Judge the same as other applications.

Women, if you do not wish to serve, return this summons to the Judge named on the reverse side as quickly as possible.

Men, if you are over 65 years of age and do not wish to serve, return this summons to the Judge named on the reverse side the same as other applications, before 12 noon Thursday preceeding your date of service. Give your date of birth in your request.

Non-Residents, if you are no longer a resident of Jackson County, Missouri, you are not eligible for jury service. Please let us know you have moved by returning this summons promptly giving your present address.

All persons duly summoned by mail as jurors may be attached for non-appearance and fined by the court for contempt.

We regret that we are unable to furnish parking for jurors.

Please bring this Summons with you when you appear at the Jury Assembly Room.

CIRCT-2800-2/75

2																																																																														
3	24	LAST NAME										42	FIRST NAME										57	58	59	60	61	DOB																																																		
4	24	HOUSE #										25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	STREET NAME										52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100

DO NOT WRITE ABOVE THIS LINE
OR INTERNAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL NOTICE AND QUESTIONNAIRE

(Not a Summons)

L

Enter change

of home address here: (Number and Street or Rural Route) (City or Town) (Zip Code)

You have been selected under the provisions of the Missouri statutes for jury service.
This questionnaire should be returned immediately.

The laws of the State of Missouri provide that if you do not answer and return this questionnaire, you are subject to citation for contempt.

The law further provides that if you knowingly and falsely answer any of the questions herein contained, you may be guilty of a misdemeanor.

The law requires your name to be placed in the jury wheel if answer is not received promptly.

BY ORDER OF THE BOARD OF JURY SUPERVISORS, UNDER AND BY AUTHORITY OF LAW.

ANN CLARDY,
Jury Commissioner

- Please state your sex. Male (.....) Female (.....).
(If you are a female and do not wish to serve, see bottom of questionnaire).
- Name of husband or wife.
- Are you over sixty-five years of age? Yes (.....) No (.....).
Date of Birth. Month.....; Day.....; Year.....
- Are you a member of the fire company or police department?
Yes (.....) No (.....). (If your answer is "yes", state which.)
- Are you actually exercising the functions of clergyman or any professor or other teacher of any school of learning? Yes (.....) No (.....). (If your answer is "yes", state where you are so engaged.)
- Are you a registered and licensed osteopathic physician, veterinarian or chiropractor? Yes (.....) No (.....).
(If your answer is "yes", state which.)
- If you are a female, or if your answer to any of the above questions 3, 4, 5 and 6, is "yes", then under the law of Missouri, you cannot be compelled to serve as a juror, so state if you will serve. Yes (.....) No (.....).
- Are you actually engaged in the practice of law, medicine or dentistry? Yes (.....) No (.....). (If so, please state which profession.)
- Are you a member on active duty with any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States? Yes (.....) No (.....).
- Is the address shown on the questionnaire correct? Yes (.....) No (.....). (If your answer is "no", state present address.)
- Are you physically able to serve? Yes (.....) No (.....). (If not, attach physician's or authorized Christian Science practitioner's statement or you will be called.)
- Have you served within the last year? Yes (.....) No (.....). (This will be checked if your answer is "yes".)

Signature

TO MEN OVER 65 YEARS OF AGE:

If you are over sixty-five and elect not to serve, fill out this paragraph and mail questionnaire at once to jury commissioner. It will not be necessary to answer the other questions.

Give date of birth Day 2 Month DECEMBER Year 1975
I elect not to do jury service.

Signature

TO WOMEN:

The constitution permits women to elect to serve or not to serve as jurywomen. Any woman who elects not to serve will fill out this paragraph and mail this questionnaire to the jury commissioner at once. It will not be necessary to answer the other questions.

I elect not to perform jury service.

Signature

RETURN THIS
QUESTIONNAIRE
WITHIN 10 DAYS.

TABLE OF JURORS SUMMONED IN JACKSON COUNTY FOR
SERVICE IN KANSAS CITY - JANUARY, 1976

WEEK	JURORS SUMMONED		EXCUSED OR DECEASED	DEFERRED	ABSENT	APPEARED FOR SERVICE	
1/5/76	Male	247 (75.5%)	70	19	6	152	(92.7%)
	Female	80 (24.5%)	49	2	17	12	(7.3%)
	Total	327	119	21	23	164	
1/12/76	Male	260 (76.5%)	64	25	24	147	(88.6%)
	Female	80 (23.5%)	48	1	12	19	(11.4%)
	Total	340	112	26	36	166	
1/19/76	Male	245 (76.3%)	71	18	14	142	(87.1%)
	Female	76 (23.7%)	45	0	10	21	(12.9%)
	Total	321	116	18	24	163	
1/26/76	Male	234 (72.0%)	85	12	15	122	(81.9%)
	Female	91 (28.0%)	44	2	18	27	(18.1%)
	Total	325	129	14	33	149	
TOTALS FOR JANUARY 1976	Male	986 (75.1%)	290	74	59	563	(87.7%)
	Female	327 (24.9%)	186	5	57	79	(12.3%)
	Total	1,313	476	79	116	642	





TABLE OF JURORS SUMMONED IN JACKSON COUNTY FOR
SERVICE IN KANSAS CITY - FEBRUARY, 1976

WEEK OF		JURORS SUMMONED		EXCUSED DECEASED	DEFERRED	ABSENT	APPEARED FOR SERVICE	
2/2/76	Male	224	(70.9%)	64	26	16	118	(79.7%)
	Female	92	(29.1%)	46	4	12	30	(20.3%)
	Total	<u>316</u>		<u>110</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>148</u>	
2/9/76	Male	243	(73.6%)	66	18	23	136	(82.9%)
	Female	87	(26.4%)	48	1	10	28	(17.1%)
	Total	<u>330</u>		<u>114</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>164</u>	
2/17/76	Male	120	(67.1%)	35	13	4	68	(81.0%)
	Female	59	(32.9%)	37	1	5	16	(19.0%)
	Total	<u>179</u>		<u>72</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>84</u>	
2/23/76	Male	235	(69.9%)	59	19	7	150	(84.7%)
	Female	101	(30.1%)	53	2	19	27	(15.3%)
	Total	<u>336</u>		<u>112</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>177</u>	
TOTALS FOR FEBRUARY 1976	Male	822	(70.8%)	224	76	50	472	(82.4%)
	Female	339	(29.2%)	184	8	46	101	(17.6%)
	Total	<u>1,161</u>		<u>408</u>	<u>84</u>	<u>96</u>	<u>573</u>	






TABULATION OF DATA OBTAINED FROM LISTS OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR MARCH, 1976.

Week
Beginning:

		Jurors Summoned	(%)	Excused	Deferred	Not Appearing	Appeared For Service	(%)
March 1, 1976.	Female	90	(72.0%)	56	2	13	19	(13.1%)
	Male	231	(28.0%)	64	21	20	126	(86.9%)
	Total	321		120	23	33	145	
March 8, 1976.	Female	107	(31.9%)	64	2	9	32	(21.8%)
	Male	228	(68.1%)	67	37	9	115	(78.2%)
	Total	335		131	39	18	147	
March 15, 1976.	Female	107	(31.2%)	62	3	17	25	(15.2%)
	Male	228	(68.8%)	58	23	15	140	(84.8%)
	Total	343		120	26	32	165	
March 22, 1976.	Female	50	(26.0%)	27	1	8	14	(15.6%)
	Male	142	(74.0%)	40	17	9	76	(84.8%)
	Total	192		67	18	17	90	
March 29, 1976.	Female	99	(28.6%)	65	3	11	20	(12.5%)
	Male	247	(71.4%)	70	27	10	140	(87.5%)
	Total	346		135	30	21	160	
Total for Weeks of March, 1976.	Female	453	(29.5%)	274	11	58	110	15.5 (17.0%)
	Male	1,084	(70.5%)	299	125	63	597	(83.0%)
	TOTAL	1,537		573	136	121	707	


TABULATION OF DATA OBTAINED FROM LISTS OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR OCTOBER, 1975.



Week
Beginning


		Jurors Summoned	(%)	Excused	Deferred	Not Appearing	Appeared for Service	(%)
Oct. 6, 1975.	Female	92	(22.4%)	52	0	19	21	(11.5%)
	Male	<u>319</u>	(77.6%)	<u>97</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>161</u>	(88.5%)
	Total	411		149	40	42	182	
Oct. 13, 1975.	Female	88	(21.6%)	52	0	19	17	(8.6%)
	Male	<u>320</u>	(78.4%)	<u>95</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>181</u>	(91.4%)
	Total	408		147	28	35	198	
Oct. 20, 1975.	Female	91	(23.3%)	58	1	11	21	(12.1%)
	Male	<u>300</u>	(76.7%)	<u>96</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>153</u>	(87.9%)
	Total	391		154	27	36	174	
Oct. 27, 1975.	Female	59	(25.8%)	35	1	10	13	(12.5%)
	Male	<u>170</u>	(74.2%)	<u>52</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>91</u>	(87.5%)
	Total	229		87	15	23	104	
Total for Weeks in October, 1975.	Female	330	(22.9%)	197	2	59	72	(10.9%)
	Male	<u>1109</u>	(77.1%)	<u>340</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>586</u>	(89.1%)
	Total	1439		537	110	136	658	

TABULATION OF DATA OBTAINED FROM LISTS OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR SEPTEMBER, 1975.



Week Beginning		Jurors Summoned	(%)	Excused	Deferred	Not Appearing	Appeared for Service	(%)
Sept. 1, 1975.	Female	64	(28.2%)	40	4	10	10	(10.3%)
	Male	<u>163</u>	(71.8%)	<u>43</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>87</u>	(89.7%)
	Total	227		83	19	28	97	
Sept. 8, 1975.	Female	113	(29.1%)	60	1	22	30	(17.5%)
	Male	<u>275</u>	(70.9%)	<u>81</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>141</u>	(82.5%)
	Total	388		141	31	45	171	
Sept. 15, 1975.	Female	78	(27.5%)	43	0	12	23	(16.0%)
	Male	<u>206</u>	(72.5%)	<u>54</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>121</u>	(84.0%)
	Total	284		97	15	28	144	
Sept. 22, 1975.	Female	108	(27.7%)	65	2	20	21	(11.2%)
	Male	<u>282</u>	(72.5%)	<u>71</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>167</u>	(88.8%)
	Total	390		136	29	37	188	
Sept. 29, 1975.	Female	93	(24.0%)	49	5	14	25	(12.8%)
	Male	<u>294</u>	(76.0%)	<u>72</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>170</u>	(87.2%)
	Total	387		121	37	34	195	
Total for Weeks in September, 1975.	Female	456	(27.2%)	257	12	78	109	(13.7%)
	Male	<u>1220</u>	(72.8%)	<u>321</u>	<u>119</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>686</u>	(86.3%)
	Total	1676		578	131	172	795	

TABULATION OF DATA OBTAINED FROM LISTS OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR AUGUST, 1975.



Week Beginning		Jurors Summoned	(%)	Excused	Deferred	Not Appearing	Appeared for Service	(%)
Aug. 4, 1975.	Female	42	(24.3%)	25	0	7	10	(12%)
	Male	<u>131</u>	(75.7%)	<u>30</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>73</u>	(88%)
	Total	173		55	15	20	83	
Aug. 11, 1975	Female	56	(24%)	30	1	12	13	(12.6%)
	Male	<u>177</u>	(76%)	<u>43</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>90</u>	(87.4%)
	Total	233		73	15	42	103	
Aug. 18, 1975.	Female	45	(20%)	28	1	7	9	(9.9%)
	Male	<u>181</u>	(80%)	<u>47</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>82</u>	(90.1%)
	Total	226		75	34	26	91	
Aug. 25, 1975.	Female	59	(25.7%)	23	0	15	21	(17.6%)
	Male	<u>170</u>	(74.3%)	<u>44</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>98</u>	(82.4%)
	Total	229		67	12	31	119	
Total for Weeks in August, 1975.	Female	202	(23.5%)	106	2	41	53	(13%)
	Male	<u>659</u>	(76.5%)	<u>164</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>78</u>	<u>343</u>	(87%)
	Total	861		270	76	119	396	

TABULATION OF DATA OBTAINED FROM LISTS OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR JULY, 1975.


Week Beginning		Jurors Summoned	(%)	Excused	Deferred	Not Appearing	Appeared for Service	(%)
July 7, 1975. (Exhibit # 7)	Female	75	(24.8%)	51	2	12	10	(8.7%)
	Male	<u>227</u>	(75.2%)	<u>71</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>105</u>	(91.3%)
	Total	302		122	33	32	115	
July 14, 1975. (Exhibit # 8)	Female	108	(28.3%)	48	5	18	37	(22.1%)
	Male	<u>273</u>	(71.7%)	<u>88</u>	<u>44</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>130</u>	(77.9%)
	Total	381		136	49	29	167	
July 21, 1975. (Exhibit # 9)	Female	101	(26.9%)	69	2	9	21	(14.7%)
	Male	<u>275</u>	(73.1%)	<u>78</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>122</u>	(85.3%)
	Total	376		147	52	34	143	
July 28, 1975. (Exhibit # 10)	Female	116	(30.0%)	60	3	27	26	(15.8%)
	Male	<u>271</u>	(70.0%)	<u>78</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>139</u>	(84.2%)
	Total	387		138	34	50	165	
Total for Weeks in July, 1975.	Female	400	(27.5%)	228	12	66	94	(15.1%)
	Male	<u>1046</u>	(72.5%)	<u>315</u>	<u>156</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>496</u>	(34.9%)
	Total	1446		543	168	145	590	

Exh. 2 MFINT

TABULATION OF DATA OBTAINED FROM LISTS OF JURORS SUMMONED FOR JUNE, 1975.

Week Beginning		Jurors Summoned	(%)	Excused	Deferred	Not Appearing	Appeared for Service	(%)
June 2, 1975. (Exhibit # 2)	Female	113	(30.8%)	67	5	12	29	(19.0%)
	Male	<u>255</u>	(69.2%)	<u>79</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>124</u>	(81.0%)
	Total	368		146	40	29	153	
<hr/>								
June 9, 1975. (Exhibit # 3)	Female	99	(26.6%)	54	5	14	26	(16.6%)
	Male	<u>273</u>	(63.4%)	<u>83</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>133</u>	(83.4%)
	Total	372		137	36	40	159	
<hr/>								
June 16, 1975. (Exhibit # 4)	Female	65	(24.1%)	39	3	10	13	(11.4%)
	Male	<u>205</u>	(85.9%)	<u>59</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>101</u>	(88.6%)
	Total	270		98	30	28	114	
<hr/>								
June 23, 1975. (Exhibit # 5)	Female	116	(30.5%)	55	6	26	29	(18.1%)
	Male	<u>264</u>	(69.5%)	<u>71</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>131</u>	(81.9%)
	Total	380		126	32	62	160	
<hr/>								
June 30, 1975. (Exhibit # 6)	Female	92	(24.6%)	45	3	18	26	(15.1%)
	Male	<u>282</u>	(75.4%)	<u>87</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>146</u>	(84.9%)
	Total	374		132	41	29	172	
<hr/>								
Total for Weeks in June, 1975.	Female	485	(27.5%)	260	22	80	123	(15.9%)
	Male	<u>1279</u>	(72.5%)	<u>379</u>	<u>157</u>	<u>108</u>	<u>635</u>	(84.1%)
	Total	1764		639	179	188	758	

Exhibit 1 MFAT



IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

TERM, 1978

No. 77-6068

EUGENE MINOR
Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF MISSOURI
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

JOHN ASHCROFT
Attorney General

PHILIP M. KOPPE
Assistant Attorney General

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TABLE OF CASES

State v. Eugene Minor, 556 S.W.2d 35 (1977);

Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264 (1942);

Foreman v. U.S., 361 U.S. 416 (1960);

Pittsburgh Towing Co. v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line
Co., 385 U.S. 32 (1966);

Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975);

State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11 (1977);

U.S. Const. amend. VI;

U.S. Const. amend XIV;

Art. 1, § 22(b), Mo. Const.;

Section 494.020, RSMo 1969;

Section 494.031, RSMo 1969;

Chapter 497, RSMo 1969.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

TERM, 1978

No. 77-6068

EUGENE MINOR
Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF MISSOURI
Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court is reported at 556 S.W.2d 35. A copy of that opinion appears in the petitioner's Appendix A.

JURISDICTION

On September 27, 1977, the Missouri Supreme Court issued an opinion affirming the petitioner's conviction for one count of robbery in the first degree and one count of felony murder. Thereafter, on September 29, 1977, petitioner filed a timely motion for rehearing. Petitioner's motion for rehearing was overruled by the Missouri Supreme Court on October 11, 1977. The petitioner subsequently filed this petition for writ of certiorari on January 16, 1978. United States Supreme Court Rule 22 provides that a petition for writ of certiorari to review a judgment of a state court is untimely unless it is filed within ninety days after the entry of that judgment. This rule has been

interpreted to mean that a petitioner has ninety days from the denial of his timely motion for rehearing to file a petition for writ of certiorari. Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264 (1942); Foreman v. U.S., 361 U.S. 416 (1960). Since the petitioner's motion for rehearing was denied on October 11, 1977, the petitioner had until January 9, 1978, to file a timely petition for writ of certiorari. His petition is therefore untimely. While it is true that Supreme Court Rule 22 is not jurisdictional and this Court has authority to review this case, it should not in view of the fact that no good cause has been shown for the petitioner's failure to comply with Supreme Court Rules. Cf. Pittsburgh Towing Co. v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 385 U.S. 32 (1966).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Was the petitioner's right to a fair trial denied because the Missouri Constitution gives women the right to avoid jury duty by requesting an exemption?

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 22(b) of the Missouri Constitution, Section 494.020, Section 494.031 and Chapter 497 of the Missouri Revised Statutes 1969. These constitutional provisions and statutes are set out in full in the respondent's Appendix A.

STATEMENT

The petitioner Eugene Minor was convicted of one count of robbery in the first degree and one count of felony murder. Prior to his trial the petitioner filed a motion to quash the jury venire claiming that it had not been drawn from a representative cross-section of the community because of the operation of Article I, Section 22(b) of the Missouri Constitution. In support of his motion the petitioner introduced statistical evidence to show that women comprised 54.4% of the population in Jackson County, Missouri, over twenty-one years of age; that petitioner's jury

venire of 55 had 6 women; and the petit jury of 12 was totally male. Petitioner also introduced evidence that the percentages of women who appeared for jury services in the months preceeding his trial were as follows: June - 15.9% women; July - 15.1% women; August - 13% women; September 1 13.7% women; and October - 10.9% women. The petitioner also submitted the testimony of John Fitzgerald, the Jackson County jury commissioner, and Robert J. Kramer, the director of data processing for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, to indicate how jurors were selected to serve in Jackson County, Missouri. The petitioner's motion to quash the jury was overruled.

The petitioner's conviction was appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court and heard in conjunction with State of Missouri v. Duren, State of Missouri v. Lee, and State of Missouri v. Harlin, since each of these cases also raised the question of whether Article I, Section 22(b), of the Missouri Constitution operates to exclude women from jury duty resulting in jury panels which do not represent a fair cross-section of the community.

On September 27, 1977, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction holding that Article I, Section 22(b) of the Missouri Constitution does not exclude women from jury duty and that the jury panel from which the petitioner's jury was chosen did represent a fair cross-section of the community. Similar opinions were returned in Lee, Harlin and Duren. Petitions for writ of certiorari have also been filed in those cases.

In order to fully understand the question presented by this case, it is necessary to consider the jury selection system which is employed in Jackson County, Missouri. That system is mandated by Section 494.031, Section 494.020, and Chapter 497 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri 1969, and Article I, Section 22(b) of the Missouri Constitution. Each of these provisions appears in respondent's Appendix A.

The jury selection system in Jackson County begins with the voter registration list. From that list the jury commissioner

selects at random by computer approximately 70,000 names. A questionnaire is then sent to each individual selected. A copy of that questionnaire appears in Section 497.130, RSMo Supp. 1975, respondent's Appendix A. Among other things, that questionnaire notifies women of their right to be excused from jury duty. When these questionnaires are returned, the jury commissioner eliminates all individuals whose questionnaire indicates that they have exercised their right to be excused or that they are unqualified to serve as jurors.* The remaining pool of names is then entered into a computer and 25,000 names are randomly selected for the master jury wheel. If an individual fails to return the questionnaire then the individual's name is automatically included in the pool from which the master jury wheel is selected. In Jackson County a new jury wheel is prepared each year.

Individuals are periodically selected from the master jury wheel by computer to make up the general jury panel for all civil and criminal divisions of the Jackson County Circuit Court. Jury summonses are sent out to each one of those individuals randomly selected from the jury wheel. These summonses notify women that they have a right to be excused from jury duty. After receiving the summons, the individual is given an opportunity to present to the circuit court reasons why he or she would be unable to serve as a juror. All jurors who are not excused should appear in the circuit court for jury duty. If a woman does not appear, it is assumed that she has exercised her right not to serve. Venire panels are then randomly selected from the individuals

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* In order to promote an orderly and efficient judicial system, certain individuals are excluded from jury service by Section 494.020, RSMo Supp. 1975. For example, licensed attorneys and those unable to understand the English language may not serve on juries in Missouri. Section 494.031, RSMo Supp. 1975, on the other hand, allows certain individuals to be excused from jury duty if they make a timely application to the court; for example, persons over 65, doctors of medicine, school teachers, government workers, or clergy. Also, Article I, Section 22(b) mandates that a court shall excuse any woman who requests exemption before she is sworn.

which have appeared for jury duty and the petit jury is selected from the venire panel. In the petitioner's case the record would indicate that his jury venire of 55 had 6 women and his petit jury of 12 was totally male.

ARGUMENT

I

The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in State of Missouri v. Eugene Minor is not in conflict with this Court's decision in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).

In Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, this Court held that the jury selection system employed by the State of Louisiana deprived criminal defendants of their right to an impartial trial. La. Const. Art. VII, Section 41 (since repealed), sets out the constitutionally offensive procedure:

"The legislature shall provide for the election and drawing of competent and intelligent jurors for the trial of civil and criminal cases; provided, however, that no women shall be drawn for jury service unless she shall have previously filed with the clerk of the district court a written declaration of her desire to be subject to such service. . . ."

This Court pointed out that this provision operated to systematically exclude women from jury service, and therefore, deprived criminal defendants of a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the community.

On the basis of the Taylor decision, the petitioner argues that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial because Article I, Section 22(b) of the Missouri Constitution allows women to avoid jury duty by requesting an exemption. The Louisiana constitutional provision cited and Article I, Section 22(b) of the Missouri Constitution, however, are readily distinguishable. In Louisiana

a woman was not eligible for jury service unless she took affirmative steps to inform the court of her desire to serve as a juror. In Missouri, on the other hand, women are automatically included in the jury list. They are excused from jury service only when they take affirmative steps to notify the court that they do not wish to serve. The Missouri system of jury selection, therefore, does not exclude women. It merely allows an exemption for those who choose to exercise it. In this Court's opinion in Taylor, it stated that ". . . jury wheels, pools of names, panels or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof." Taylor v. Louisiana, supra at 538 (emphasis added) The petitioner relies heavily on this language in Taylor and yet it is evident from Article I, Section 22(b) of the Missouri Constitution that women in no way are excluded by the State of Missouri from serving on juries. They are not in any way even remotely inhibited from serving on juries. It is solely their decision as to whether they will exercise their right to be excused.

Taylor v. Louisiana also indicates that a defendant must show that the jury wheels from which juries are chosen fail to reasonably represent a cross-section of the community. Petitioner has asserted that he has met the burden of proof imposed by Taylor v. Louisiana. In Taylor v. Louisiana, however, the evidence showed that no more than 10% of the persons on the master jury list were women, that only twelve women were among the 1,800 persons drawn to fill petit jury venires during the period when the defendant was tried; and that the 175 member venire from which the defendant's petit jury was in fact drawn had no women on it. In contrast, the petitioner's own evidence shows that the 55 member venire from which the petitioner's jury was chosen contained 6 women. This composition could hardly be characterized as almost totally male, the standard enunciated in Taylor v. Louisiana. It seems clear that the situation in Taylor v. Louisiana, supra, was an extreme case which resulted from the state's require-

ment that women take affirmative steps to participate in the jury selection process, effectively excluding women from jury service. Such is not the case in Jackson County, Missouri.

II

This case is plagued with evidentiary problems which will prevent this Court from reaching the question of whether the defendant's right to a fair trial has been denied.

The petitioner alleges that the female jury exemption in Missouri causes gross underrepresentation of women on jury panels. The record in this case, however, does not show that there is any relationship between Article I, Section 22(b), and the alleged underrepresentation of women on juries in Jackson County. First, the petitioner has failed to present eligible population statistics. At the hearing on his motion for new trial, the petitioner introduced the 1970 United States census figures which show that Jackson County had approximately 407,000 inhabitants over 21 years of age and 54% of those inhabitants were women. The annual Jackson County jury selection process, however, begins with the current voter registration list. No proof was made that the sexes register to vote in direct relation to their numbers or that there has not been a significant change in the makeup of Jackson County, Missouri, between 1970 and 1975 when the petitioner's jury was selected. As stated by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11 (1977):

"All of this suggests that statistics of current 'eligible population' referred to in Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, not six year old gross population figures, provide the proper starting point."

More importantly, the petitioner has failed to produce any evidence to show that the percentage of women who actually appeared in court for jury service was less than the percentage of women initially summoned for jury service because a substantial number of women exercised their right to drop out of the jury process

solely because of their sex. Section 494.020, RSMo Supp. 1975, provides exemption for groups other than women. For example, clergymen, doctors, teachers, dentists, or any person over sixty-five years of age are also entitled to automatic exemption from jury service. It is possible that the alleged disparity between the number of men and women on the petitioner's venire resulted from women exercising occupational or physical exemptions. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to show that this numerical disparity was not the result of random chance. Hence, the petitioner's statistical evidence, standing alone, fails to show that the petitioner's jury was not drawn from a representative cross-section of the community because of the number of women who exercised their right to excuse themselves from jury service solely on the basis of their sex.

In Taylor v. Louisiana, supra at 524, the parties stipulated that the "discrepancy between females eligible for jury service and those actually included in the venire was the result of the operation of the Louisiana Constitution." No similar stipulation has been made in this case.

III

The scope of the question presented by this petition is so narrow that a decision by this Court will have little application.

Only the State of Missouri and the State of Tennessee still allow women an exemption from jury duty and the only place in the State of Missouri that this issue has been raised is in Jackson County, Missouri. No complaint has been heard from any other part of the State of Missouri, although this issue has been well publicized. The scope of this petition therefore is so narrow that review by this Court is not warranted.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, respondent respectfully requests this Court to deny the petitioner's writ of certiorari to the Missouri Supreme Court.

Respectfully submitted,

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THE APPENDIX WAS NOT OF PHOTOGRAPHIC QUALITY AND THEREFORE
HAS NOT BEEN FILMED.